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INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET. By Henry G. Manne. 
New York: Free Press. 1966. Pp. xiii, 274. $6.95. 
"Socrates is an evil-doer, and a curious person, who searches into 
things under the earth and in heaven, and he makes the worse a p-
pear the better cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doctrines to 
others.''1 This indictment should have been a warning to Professor 
Manne about what happens to a person who questions the funda-
mental beliefs of his community. He is fortunate that the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) does not have hemlock among 
what it likes to refer to as its "arsenal of weapons." 
1. 3 WORKS OF PLATO 103 (B. Jowett transl. 1937). 
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In this book, which has become something of a cause celebre, 
Professor Manne asks: "What is wrong with insider trading on the 
basis of secret information not generally available to the public?" 
And he answers: "Nothing." In fact, he goes somewhat further and 
concludes that insider trading is probably beneficial to the economy 
and to the stockholders of the corporation whose shares are involved. 
This serious effort to understand and evaluate the policy choices 
inherent -in any rule regulating insider trading should not, and I 
believe cannot, be brushed aside by mere silence or indignation. 
Ignoring the charts and other economic paraphernalia, which I 
suspect impede the communication of ideas, Professor Manne's argu-
ment begins by testing the effects of insider trading under two alter-
native assumptions: first, that insiders do not trade during the 
interval between the development of material information affecting 
the value of a corporation's shares and public announcement of that 
information; and second, that they do trade. Under the first assump-
tion, the price will remain relatively stable during this interval 
(assuming other factors are equal) and will then rise very rapidly to a 
new level reflecting public evaluation of the new development. On 
the other hand, assuming that insiders and their tippees do trade dur-
ing this period, the increase in demand will probably cause the price 
to rise gradually to the new level.2 
Examining who might be injured under the latter assumption, 
Professor Manne finds that the long-term investor, who during this 
period is impelled to sell by factors extraneous to temporary minor 
fluctuations in the price level, will be better off if insiders trade than 
if they do not. Long-term investors will on the average sell at a 
higher profit if the price has increased gradually due to insider pur-
chases than they would have if the price had remained stable at the 
old level. On the other hand, the short-term speculator who intends 
to sell after a slight increase in price is presumably interested in a 
short, quick ride. With insider trading, he will certainly get his 
money's worth. He cannot meaningfully be said to have any "right" 
to the additional profit represented by the undisclosed favorable 
news. In any event, it is literally impossible to determine which 
short-term speculators were induced to sell by the gradual price rise, 
and which would have sold even in the absence of a price rise due 
to insider trading. 
The conclusion which Professor Manne draws is that it is impos-
sible to demonstrate that the public or the shareholders as a group 
are "injured" by insider trading. I am not aware that he or anyone 
else has made any empirical study to prove his assertions-in fact, he 
complains that the SEC has not done so. I do not happen to share 
2. The same analysis could, of course, be made regarding unfavorable news, with 
the price movement being in the opposite direction. 
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the current belief of some academic economists that assumptions 
become "facts" when they are illustrated by a graph or chart or stated 
in an algebraic formula. I regret that Professor Manne occasionally 
seems to adopt this attitude, probably because his mind has been 
slightly poisoned by reading too much economic literature. Neverthe-
less, it seems to me that on the basis of common sense and general 
experience Professor Manne has thus far made a reasonably plausible 
case. 
Now, however, we come to the crucial point in Professor Manne's 
argument. Thus far he has assumed that there will be a considerable 
time lapse between the insiders' discovery of material information 
affecting the value of the corporation's securities and public an-
nouncement of that information. He now faces the obvious ques-
tion: Why is not the alternative to insider trading immediate public 
announcement of such information, rather than delayed announce-
ment with no insider trading? His answer is that in many cases im-
mediate public announcement would be impractical or harmful to 
the corporation and its shareholders. To illustrate, he relies primarily 
on the Texas Gulf Sulphur case,8 in which the corporation postponed 
announcement of its mineral strike in order to lease adjacent land. 
However, he recognizes that a rule permitting insider trading 
may encourage the insiders, who also control the timing of disclo-
sure of material information, to delay public announcement even 
when the interest of the corporation is not involved or beyond the 
time when the corporation would benefit from nondisclosure. Pro-
fessor Manne here sets forth his most controversial conclusion: in-
siders should be permitted to delay disclosure in order to profit by 
insider trading. To Professor Manne, such trading is a desirable form 
of compensation to "entrepreneurs." 
He draws an elaborate distinction between "entrepreneurs" and 
"managers" which I find impossible to follow. He seems to be say-
ing that an "entrepreneur" is a brilliant manager, and a "manager" 
is a pedestrian entrepreneur. In any event, the distinction seems 
irrelevant or perhaps even destructive of his own argument; no-
where does he even attempt to demonstrate that more "entrepre-
neurs" than "managers" will have access to inside information, or 
that a significant fraction of the persons having access to such in-
formation are "entrepreneurs." I suppose that he would respond 
that even if mere "managers" account for most of the insider trading, 
that is not an objection to his theory since outsiders are not "harmed" 
by the practice anyway. As long as some entrepreneurial activity 
is rewarded by insider trading, the practice is beneficial to the 
economy since it presumably encourages invention and innovation. 
The only effective way to criticize this elaborate theory is to ex-
3. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
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amine the basic assumption upon which the entire superstructure 
rests. The author asserts at the very outset of the book that the stock 
market is a mechanism for the purchase and sale of "information." 
This is one of those propositions which is so preposterously silly 
that it could have been thought of only by a very learned man. The 
stock market is a mechanism for the purchase and sale of securities; 
its function is to reflect the freely competitive security prices deter-
mined by willing buyers and sellers who are fully informed of the 
material facts. This is of course an ideal, but a market which strives 
to attain this ideal is an essential condition if the investing public 
is to have confidence that securities can be disposed of at a fair price 
in a reasonably competitive market. And public confidence in 
the integrity of the market is a prerequisite to the raising of new 
equity capital for productive investment. 
Professor Manne seems to conceive of the stock market as a 
gigantic floating crap game, or perhaps more accurately as a roulette 
wheel which may be legitimately fixed by the "entrepreneurs." There 
is no doubt that many persons, with both large and small amounts of 
money, enter the market with this attitude, although they frequently 
turn crybaby when they lose--or when they fail to win as much as 
they think they should have-and protest their "investment intent." 
The question is whether the market should be run to please these 
people, or whether their influence is a cancer in the market which 
should be eliminated to the extent possible. 
The logic of Professor Manne's position seems to compel the con-
clusion that no disclosure by corporations should be required. If it is 
desirable to permit insiders to trade on the basis of information prior 
to the filing of the 8-K Report4 ten days after the end of the month 
in which a material event occurs, would it not be even better to 
abolish the 8-K Report altogether and permit insiders to trade for 
seven, eight, or nine months on the basis of such information? If 
it is desirable to permit them to trade on the basis of information 
developed during the current year, would it not be even better to 
permit them to trade on the basis of information generated in prior 
years and also abolish the 10-K Report?5 
We need not speculate about the results of such a system, for 
we have already experienced it in this country between 1925 and 
1935. While one experiment may not constitute a demonstration, 
I doubt if very many people in the corporate or financial world 
would want to try it again. In summary, the basic objection to in-
sider trading, in the words of former Chairman Cary of the SEC 
(which Professor Manne ridicules) is that it jeopardizes the "integrity 
of the stock market." 
4. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1968). 
5. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1968). 
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If this analysis is correct, then the basic purpose of a rule against 
insider trading is not to compensate or punish anyone or prevent 
unjust enrichment but to force prompt disclosure of important cor-
porate developments as soon as this is feasible. No elaboration of 
periodic reporting can effectively accomplish this result. I do not 
by any means discount the difficulties of formulating a workable 
rule of this nature. I have been engaged over the past few months in 
trying to draft such a provision in connection with the new Cali-
fornia Corporate Securities Law of 1968, and I would be the last 
to say that it is an easy task. Nor do I minimize the administrative 
and judicial problems of enforcement. However, if we can agree 
upon the objective of such a rule, I believe that its formulation will 
be feasible. 
Professor's Manne's book performs a badly needed and highly 
valuable service in forcing consideration of basic policy questions. 
I happen to arrive at the opposite conclusion from his because I 
start with different assumptions. But, unless we are willing to formu-
late and defend our assumptions regarding basic policy objectives, 
the law will continue to flounder around in this area as it has in the 
recent past. For this reason, the book is a significant contribution and 
deserves the most serious consideration. 
Harold Marsh, Jr., 
Professor of Law, 
University of California, Los Angeles 
